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TORTS AND BANKRUPTCY - A SYNTHESIS
G. STANLEY JOSLIN *
"Oh what a tangled web . . ."
The all-powerful law of bankruptcy clashes with the basic law of
torts in myriad places, completely inundating some areas, leaving islets
here and there, and vast untouched continents in still other areas.
Although the invasion of the bankruptcy law into this tort law area
has occurred in many parts of the Bankruptcy Act, these points of
contact are not, in many instances, as clearly marked as they might
be; nor are the relationships among them recognized by the unwary.
Each pocket of contact between the bankruptcy law and tort law may
be well charted once the point is found and its relationship to other
points of contact established, but the object herein is to point out and
interrelate these areas of contact so that a broad chart of torts in
bankruptcy is available.
Basically torts involved in bankruptcy may be considered from
one of two approaches: either as a tort claim held by, or as a one held
against, a bankrupt. The first approach presents a question as to
whether the trustee in bankruptcy may take advantage of the claim
as part of the estate available to creditors, and a second question as to
whether one may use the claim as a base for sharing in a distribution
of the bankrupt estate. Important and key differences are found in
each of these two basic approaches and must be kept constantly in
mind. In addition, gradations of torts must be carefully noted, such
as those in which liability results from negligence, those for intentional
misconduct, those characterized by good faith, and those in which
liability exists without fault. In addition notice must be taken as to
whether the tort results in injury to the person either physically or
emotionally, or is reflected by damage to property. In addition to the
consideration of the tort from the viewpoint of its being an asset of,
or claim against, the estate, its gradation and object, it can not be
overlooked that tort claims may pass through stages of metamorphosis
during the administration of the estate from claim, to cause of action,
to judgment, Keeping these important points of observation in mind,
the over-all picture will develop into a logical whole with only a few
soft spots of uncertainty.
TORT CLAIMS HELD BY THE BANKRUPT
A right of action based upon a tortious injury to the bankrupt
may represent a very substantial asset of potentially great value to
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B., Columbia Univer-
LL.B. 1939, University of Wisconsin; LL.M. 1952, University of Michigan.
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his creditors if it can be brought into the bankruptcy proceeding as
an asset of the estate. Section 70 of the Bankruptcy Act deals with
this problem. 1
 Under that section, the first determination to be made
is whether the cause of action existed at the time of filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition. If it arose subsequent to filing it can not be con-
sidered as an estate asset, but is held free of the bankruptcy proceed-
ings.' Of the causes held by the bankrupt at the time of the filing
of the petition some do and others do not become assets in the
hands of the trustee. Those absolutely passing to the trustee are set
out in Section 70a(6) 3 and include rights of action arising upon the
unlawful taking or detention of, or injury to, the bankrupt's property.
An important characteristic of a 70a(6) tort is that no further test
need be made to determine whether the trustee takes the cause of
action.' A second major category of tort actions which may ultimately
be determined to be estate assets are covered by Section 70a(5) and
fall into two types, those which are reachable by judicial process, and
those which are transferable or subject to judicial process.' The first
proviso of Section 70a(5) sets out what tort claims will pass to the
trustee if they are subject to judicial process. It is to be noted that
with respect to this category transferability of the claim is of no
consequence, the essential factor is whether it is subject to judicial
process. In this group are included ex delicto actions for libel, slander,
seduction, criminal conversation and injuries to the person of the
bankrupt or of a relative.° Thus it is seen that under Section 70a(6)
all rights of action for tortious injury to property pass to the trustee
while under 70a(5), first proviso, rights of action for injuries to the
person pass only if subject to judicial process.'
1 11 U.S.C. Sec. 110. Hereafter the Bankruptcy Act will be referred to in the
text as the Act and in the footnotes by section.
2 Sec. 70a; 11	 Sec. 110a.
8 11 U.S.C. Sec. 110a(6).
4 The trustee may reject a right of action where he deems it too burdensome and
its enforcement unprofitable, Stephan v. Merchants Collateral Corp. 256 N.Y. 418,
176 N.E. 824 (1931). As to whether the creditors have the right to maintain the
action in the name of the trustee or whether the cause of action reverts to the bankrupt,
see Gochenour v. George & Francis Ball Foundation, 35 F. Supp. 508 (S.D. Ind. 1940),
aff'd 117 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1941) cert. denied 313 U.S. 566 (1941).
6 11 U.S.C. Sec. 110a(5).
6 By "judicial process" is meant attachment, execution, garnishment, sequestration,
or other judicial process as used in Sec. 70a(5) and 70a(5) first proviso; 11 U.S.C. Sec.
110a(5) and 110a(5) first proviso.
7 Heitfield v. Benevolent and Protective Order of Keglers, 36 Wash. 2d 685, 220
P.2d 655 (1950); Empire Tractor Corporation v. Time, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 311 (D. Pa.
1950); Henderson v. 12.6unds and Porter Lumber Co., 99 F. Supp. 376 (D. Ark.
1951. In Boudreau v. Chesley, 135 F.2d 633 (1st Cir. 1943), a bankrupt's right
of action for conspiracy to interfere with his position as a national bank president
was held not an action for "injury to property."
8 The problem of a cause of action involving both personal injury and property
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If the right of action in tort • is one that does not categorically
pass to the trustee under Section 70a(6) and also is not precluded
from so passing by Section 70a(5) first proviso then it still may pass
into the bankrupt's estate according to its status in relation to the test
of transferability or of being subject to judicial process as set forth
in section 70a(5). The Act specifically provides that the trustee shall
be vested with all the property of the bankrupt including rights of
action which he could by any means have transferred, and which might
have been levied upon and sold under judicial process and which,
otherwise, might have been seized, impounded, or sequestered. Thus
a personal injury action may be transferable and yet not subject to
be taken into bankruptcy if not amenable to seizure, or sale under
judicial process.' The total scope of Section 70 as it relates to torts,
requires certain rights of action to go to the trustee, whether trans-
ferable or subject to judicial process and defines certain others which
pass only if subject to judicial process. All others pass to the trustee
if transferable or subject to judicial process.
As in so many matters in bankruptcy, a point of time is a crucial
factor and that is true in the ascertainment and application of the
various tests which determine whether or not a tort claim will pass
to the trustee in bankruptcy and so become part of the assets of the
estate, or be retained by the bankrupt free from the proceeding. Thus
the tests of transferability or amenability to judicial process must be
applied as of the time of the filing of the petition. Ordinarily this does
not prove to be a troublesome point, for the time that a cause of action
in tort arose is normally easily ascertained. However, a pre-petition
tort cause of action may have changed its status sufficiently at the
time of the petition so as to require a reappraisal of its status for a
determination as to whether it qualifies as an estate asset. The com-
mon change of status occurs when a tort claim has become the sub-
ject of a contract or when legal action has been commenced on the
claim. It is clear that a tort claim which has become the subject of
a valid settlement contract prior to the filing of the petition has lost its
tort character and passes to the trustee as a contract right of the bank-
damages was raised in the English case of Wilson v. United Counties Bank Ltd., 11920,1
A.C. 102, 88 1033, where it was held that the trustee and the bankrupt suing
jointly could recover to the extent of their respective injuries; cf. notes on this
case in 33 Harv. L. Rev. 860 (1920), 20 Minn. L. Rev. 814 (1936).
9 Finnerty v. Consolidated Telegraph and Electric Subway Co., 82 N.Y.S.2d 529
(Sup. Ct. 1948); Gering v. Superior Court in and for Los , Angeles County 37 Cal. 2d
29, 230 P.2d 356 (1951). In Saper v. Delgado, .146 F.2d 714 (2d , Cir. 1945), a
personal injury judgment secured in New York, not being subject to attachment,
execution, garnishment or third party order under New York law, could not pass
to the trustee in bankruptcy.
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rupt."' However, the status of a tort claim on which legal proceedings
have been commenced is not so clear. To what extent is the tort claim
effected by the filing of a complaint, trial, verdict or judgment? Since
certain rights of action in tort do not pass to the trustee unless subject
to judicial process, and others unless transferable, the key seems to be
whether the tort claim is or has changed to such form or position at
the time of the filing of the petition as to be at that time transferable
or subject to judicial process. For example, the Act provides that
rights of action ex delicto for injuries to the person of the bankrupt
shall not vest in the trustee unless by State law such rights of action
are subject to judicial process." However, if legal action has been
commenced at the time of the petition and the law of the state makes
the rights under an existing action subject to judicial process, the
action would pass to the trustee even though it involves a tort which
would not itself have passed to the trustee. The same result is had
when the tort action goes to judgment. Few tort claims are subject
to judicial process while judgments normally are. Consequently when
a judgment is entered prior to the petition in bankruptcy, the judg-
ment will pass to the trustee as estate property, it being transferable
or subject to judicial process. 12 The salient point is not the name
given to the changed form of the tort claim at any particular time but
whether at the critical time it is transferable or subject to judicial
process. 13
A safe generalization may be made to the effect that while rights
of action in contract belonging to a bankrupt become part of his
estate and pass to the trustee," many rights of action in tort do not.
A "no man's land" may therefore exist where the right of action has
both tort and contract characteristics. A breach of warranty situation
is of this nature. In such a case if the tort right could not be taken
by the trustee but the contract right could, somewhat of an impasse
appears to have been reached. It does seem that the bankrupt under
such circumstances may elect which remedy he will pursue. If it
could be presumed that he would always select that form of action
which would remain a personal asset surviving bankruptcy, then it
affected by a provision in the
v. Kaiser-Frazer Sales Corp.,
Fiore, 65 A.2d 926 (D.C. Mun.
Such a principle would apply
10 The trustee's title to a contract action is not
contract forbidding assignment. Myers Motors Inc.
178 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1949); Second Realty Corp. v.
App. 1949); Gazlay v. Williams, 210 U.S. 41 (1908).
to contracts of settlement.
11 Sec. 70a(5) first proviso; 11 U.S.C.
12 For a case reaching a contrary result
supra note 9, to the effect that, a certain
on such an action was similarly non-assign
13 Ruebush v. Funk, 63 F.2d 170 (4th
14 Sec. 70a(5); 11 U.S.C. Sec. 110a(5).
Sec. 110a(5) first proviso.
under New York law, cf. Saper v. Delgado,
tort action being non-assignable, a verdict
able.
Cir. 1933).
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might be argued that the claim should be treated as one in tort which
would not pass to the estate. On the other hand it might be contended
that since the now bankrupt had the right to elect whether he could
treat the claim as one in tort or one in contract the right of election
passes to the trustee under the provisions of the Act vesting in the
trustee the powers of the bankrupt which he might have exercised for
his own benefit. 15
 If this latter theory be accepted, the trustee would
presumably exercise the power by electing to treat the cause of action
as one in contract. However, there is a serious doubt as to whether
the scope of the "powers" in the Act dealt with would be broad enough
to encompass the right to make such a selection." It is suggested that
this problem be resolved by applying the test of the bankrupt's posi-
tion at the time of the petition. His position is that of one who may
elect to enforce the cause of action either as one in tort, which neces-
sarily would not pass to the trustee, or one in contract, which would
so pass. It is into the shoes of the bankrupt in this position with his
rights, powers, property interests, elections or alternate interests in
this regard that the trustee steps. Consequently the trustee can make
this claim an asset available to the creditors if it could have been
transferred or levied upon and sold under judicial process. This
means that a claim enforceable either as a contract or a tort claim
is to be characterized as neither until an election has been exercised
and the right of election passes to the trustee if it is assignable or
subject to judicial process in that form. Of course, if the selection
is made before the petition, the form of action so selected is either
contract or tort and is to be treated accordingly in determining whether
it is an estate asset. It is conceivable, however, that the pleadings
would not make a clear selection. In that case, it is probable that
the court, wherein the action is brought, would have to determine
the true nature of the action for purposes of classifying it as a right
of action sounding in tort or contract.
It is possible that the privilege of electing between a contract or
tort cause of action might be lost by operation of law, as for example,
by the outlawing of one or the other cause by the running of the
statute of limitations. If such is the situation at the time of the
filing of the petition the nature of the surviving enforceable right
tis Sec. 70a(3) ; 11 U.S.C. Sec. 110a(3).
le "Generally stated, a 'power' is the right, ability or faculty of doing something;
but in the restricted sense in which the term is herein used [Sec. 70a(3)I, a 'power' is a
'liberty or authority reserved by, or limited to, a person to dispose of real or personal
property, for his own benefit or the benefit of others, or enabling one person to
dispose of an interest which is vested in another"'--Nadler, Creditor and Debtor
Relations, p. 609, 11 13, (1956) ; cf. Collier, Bankruptcy, 11 70.13 (14th ed. 1958) ;
MacLachlan, Bankruptcy, Sec. 176, p. 177 (1956).
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is the only one to be considered in determining whether the claim
is an estate asset. As a tort right of action is more apt to be cut off by
the statute of limitations than one in contract, it is conceivable that
although a trustee would not ordinarily take if the petition was filed
before election, he could take if by operation of law before the filing
of the petition one right of action became unenforceable and the
other was clearly classifiable as being of the type available to the
estate.
THE POSITION OF CREDITORS HAVING TORT CLAIMS
Of the three main points of contact between the law of torts
and bankruptcy, the first, dealing with the rights of the trustee
in bankruptcy to tort claims held by the bankrupt, has been con-
sidered. The second main point of contact to be considered is the
participation of a tort claimant against the bankrupt's estate. No
generalized statement of principle in this regard covering the entire
field of tort claims can be ventured, but here classifications must be
made as to whether the tort claim rests on negligence or willful
misconduct or whether the tort claim has been supplanted by a con-
tract of settlement or release, or whether the claim has been the
subject of litigation or has gone to judgment. Once the claim is so
classified, the question as to its reception as a claim in bankruptcy
will, in most cases, easily be ascertained.
To develop the present problem concerning tort claims against
the bankrupt and the claimants' participation in the bankrupt's
estate, a basic generalization may be made. No tort claim may be
provable in bankruptcy unless such is specifically permitted by the
Bankruptcy Act." The Act . grants its first important concession to
tort claims in Section 63 (7) wherein the right to recover damages
in any action for negligence instituted prior to and pending at the time
of the petition may be proved and allowed against the estate.'s It will
be noticed that only tort actions based on negligence may be the
basis for such a claim. 19 No distinction is made in the Act between
personal injury and property damage actions. There is no provision
for claims resulting from either intentional torts or from those arising
17 Schall v. Camors, 251 U.S. 239 (1920), noted 20 Colum. L. Rev. 481 (1920) ; 15
Ill, L, Rev. 220 (1920) ; 29 Yale L.J. 455 (1920). "The exclusion of tort claims in
general seems an anachronism tracing back to the old idea that bankruptcy is only for
traders." MacLachlan, Bankruptcy, Sec. 138, p. 128 (1956).
18 11 U.S.C. Sec, 103a(7).
19 To the extent that awards of workmen's compensation involve injury or death
from injury, if the injury occurred prior to adjudication in bankruptcy, it is a prov-
able claim; Sec. 63a(7). The fact that the injury may have resulted from an intentional
tort would not of course, under this section, affect its provable character.'
190
TORTS AND BANKRUPTCY--A SYNTHESIS
in liability without fault cases, as a consequence of which such are
never provable. It must be further noted that a right of action based
on negligent injury to person or property is not by this fact alone
provable, but in addition the action must have been instituted prior
to and be pending at the time of the filing of the petition.2° Actions
dismissed before the petition in bankruptcy are, of course, not
provable.' Likewise actions for negligent injury commenced after
the petition is filed can not constitute provable claims.
While claims for torts resulting in willful injury to person or
property are not provable even though action thereon was instituted
prior to, and was pending at the time of, the petition, if such actions
had progressed to judgment by that time they would be provable. 22
This is true also of judgments rendered on negligent torts prior to
the petition.23
To summarize:
1. No differentiation is made between tortious injuries
to person or to property.
2. Claims for negligent torts in themselves are not prov-
able but become such when reduced to judgment before the
petition or when litigation has been instituted thereon
and is pending at the time of the petition.
3. Claims for willful tort are not provable but become
such when reduced to judgment prior to the petition.
The dual-natured claim which may sound either in tort or
contract may be provable under the Act, not as a tort claim but
as one founded on a contract express or implied. 24 The tort or
contract nature of a right of action when considered from the view-
point of its provable character does not present a contentious problem.
The same can not be said with respect to the discharge of such
claims, this being an area in which the battle is bloody, and of which
more will be said later when discharges are specifically discussed.
The third main point of contact between tort law and the Bank-
20 Sec. 63a(7); 11 U.S.C. Sec. 103a(7); Collins v. Isaacs, 258 App. Div. 806, 15
N.Y.S.2d 983 (2d Dep't 1939). For an unusual case in which the negligence claim
was tried before the referee in bankruptcy, no point having been made of the requirement
of the institution of the action prior to petition under 63a(7), see In Re Sabbatino
and Co., 150 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1945).
21 Sec. 63a(7) ; 11 U.S.C. Sec. 103a(7).
22 Landgraf v. Griffith, 41 Ind. App. 372, 83 N.E. 10, 21 (1875).
23 Sec. 63a(1); 11 U.S.C. Sec. 103a(1); Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U.S. 467 (1925).
24 F.L. Grant Shoe Co. v. W. M. Laird Co., 211 U.S. 445 (1909). To the effect
that a tort giving rise to quasi-contractual relief constitutes a provable claim, see
Crawford v. Burke, 195 U.S. 176 (1904); cf. notes in 13 Mich. L. Rev. 693 (1915);
.31 Mich. L. Rev. 389 (1933).
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ruptcy Act is that of discharge of a tort claim. Since the purpose of
bankruptcy is primarily to relieve a debtor of a crippling debt load,
the generalized result of a proceeding in bankruptcy is to discharge
the bankrupt from all claims, debts and rights held against him so
that he may be able to make a fresh start. However, certain defined
obligations are not discharged and may be enforced after bankruptcy.
Tort claims by their nature are more apt to survive the bankruptcy
proceeding than claims based on contract. The Act has clearly
excepted a vast area of tort claims from discharge but non-statutory
authority for such exception is not easily found. Of course, non-
provable claims are not dischargeable and survive the bankruptcy
proceedings. Provable tort claims may share in the distribution of
the bankrupt's estate and emerge with the unpaid balance of the claim
still valid and enforceable against the discharged tort-feasor.
The vast majority of tort claims fall in the category of non-
provable and so non-dischargeable claims. However, a cause of
action for negligent tort instituted and pending, or a claim based on
a judgment in any tort case existing, as of the time of the filing of
the petition, is provable and so subject to discharge.25 A claim based
on a willful tort not reduced to judgment, as previously indicated,
is not provable and so not dischargeable.
In summary tort claims are treated in bankruptcy as follows:
1. Willful tort claims not dischargeable.
2. Negligent tort claims not dischargeable.
3. Negligent tort action instituted and pending dischargeable.
4. Judgments in tort actions dischargeable.
The question as to what tort claims are provable and thus dis-
chargeable has been considered from the standpoint of a clear and
unified right of action for tort only. A more difficult problem presents
itself when the right of action has both tort and contractual aspects.
The dual nature of this type of claim is of interest as it bears upon
discharge. The situation is critical when the claim regarded as a tort
is not provable and thus not dischargeable; while regarded as a con-
tract the contrary is true. It seems there could be three basic
approaches to this problem. The first approach would be to require
the claimant to elect, within the time specified for the filing of claims,
how he wished his claim to be treated. Thus if he filed he would be
regarded as treating his claim as one in contract and the tort aspects
of it would vanish. The claim would then share in the estate and be
25 There is still a question as to whether the provable tort claim is excepted from.
discharge by specific exception contained in the Act.
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subject to discharge as any contract claim." However, if he did not
file his claim, the contract aspect would be forfeited and only the tort
claim would remain. A second possibility would be to allow the
claimant to assert his claim as a tort surviving and unaffected by the
bankruptcy irrespective as to whether the contract claim was dis-
charged. The third approach would be to permit the claimant to
prove in bankruptcy as a contract claimant with the possibility of a
recovery of any deficiency in a tort action subsequent to the bank-
ruptcy. It seems that any claim which may be regarded as either
contractual or tortious in nature should be so treated as to permit
the claimant to pursue it to as complete a recovery as possible by
allowing him to regard it as a contract claim for purposes of
participation in the bankruptcy proceedings and at the same time
as a tort claim for residual relief against the tort-feasor after dis-
charge. However, it is generally held that such claims, since they
can possibly be asserted in bankruptcy, must be handled as contract
claims, provable and dischargeable. 27
In determining whether a tort claim is dischargeable, the
question of its provability must first be resolved as previously con-
sidered. If provable, it will be discharged unless some specific exemp-
tion from discharge covers it, included among which are exemption
claims arising out of the torts of obtaining money or property by
false pretenses or false representations, willful and malicious injury
to person or property, seduction of an unmarried female, criminal
conversation and fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation or defalcation
while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity." Of these
exceptions, the two most sweeping and generalized are those based on
fraud, and on willful and malicious injuries. The intent of the Act,
then, is to exempt from discharge only those tort claims resulting from
the more serious breaches of conduct.
A claim for injury to persons or property, based upon simple
negligence, is not dischargeable under any circumstances," however,
if the claim became the subject of a legal action pending at the time
of the filing of the bankruptcy petition or was reduced to judgment
at that time it would be discharged. On the other hand liabilities
26 Sec. 63a(4); 11 U.S.C. Sec. 103a(4).
27 Sec. 63a(4); 11 U.S.C. Sec. 103a(4). See Collier, Bankruptcy, 11 63.23, p.
1858 (14th ed. 1958); Remington, Bankruptcy, Sec. 3307 (6th ed. 1955). It is important
to keep in mind that only the question of initial discharge of a claim which is provable
is considered at this point. Some claims, though provable, may still not be discharged,
because they are specifically exempted from discharge under the Act.
29 Sec. 17a(4) ; 11 U.S.C. 351(4).
29 Sec. 63a(7) and 17(a); 11 U.S.C. Secs. 103a(7) and 3.5(a).
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for willful and malicious injuries are extempted from discharge."
The importance of this exemption of willful and malicious torts may
be given undue significance unless one considers the improbability
of this type of claim being processed in bankruptcy at all. Since
a claim for damages caused by a tort is not provable in bankruptcy,'
it seldom reaches the point where its exception from discharge is
worthy of consideration or comment. In only three instances can
claims for willful and malicious injury to person or property appear
in a bankruptcy proceeding so as to raise any question as to their
exemption from . discharge, to wit when the claims had been re-
duced to judgment, or had been settled by contractual arrangements,
or are of a mixed tort and contract nature. If the claim has been
reduced to judgment or been the subject of a contract of settlement,
it then, in its new form, becomes provable, 82
 whereupon the question
arises whether it survives discharge as a form of liability claim for
willful and malicious injuries. It will be noted that "liabilities" for
willful and malicious injuries are exempt from discharge under Sec.
17a(2). Since the judgment or contract which has replaced the
original claim for damages arises out of a tort claim for a willful and
malicious injury, it is not discharged and is enforceable against the
tort-feasor after bankruptcy." If the claim is both contractual and
tortious in nature, and is properly filed and proved, it will not be
discharged if the claim had arisen out of the obtaining of money or
property by false pretenses or false representations or is for willful
and malicious injuries."
Torts exempt from discharge, other than those for fraud or
willful and malicious injuries, need only be mentioned again with a
warning that they may not be as extensive as a casual observation
might indicate. Thus a claim for breach of promise of marriage is
specifically exempt from discharge only if accompanied by seduction; 85
tort claims for fraud, embezzlement, misappropriations or defalca-
80 Both willfulness and maliciousness are required under the Act. Sec. 17a(2);
U.S.C. Sec. 35a(2). See Seward v. Gatlin, 193 Tenn. 299, 246 S.W.2d 21 (1952).
Thus a claim arising out of an automobile collision occurring because of lack of sleep
of the operator does not constitute willful and malicious conduct. Johnstone v. Gardiner,
151 Me. 196, 116 A.2d 776 (1955).
21 Sec. 63a; 11 U.S.C. Sec. 103a.
32 Sec. 63a(1) & (4); 11 U.S.C. Sec. 103a(1) & (4).
33 See Collier, Bankruptcy, fr 17.17, p. 1617 (14th ed. 1958).
84 Sec. I7a(2); 11 U.S.C. Sec. 35a(2). The scope and exemption from discharge
of liabilities for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property has been
extended by interpreting "willful and malicious" to mean "intentional" injury. See
Collier, op. cit. 17.17 and cases therein cited.
55 Such a claim may be filed by the father for the loss of his daughter's services
resulting from the seduction. In re Freche, 109 Fed. 620 (D. N.J. 1901).
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tions by officers or those in a fiduciary capacity are also specially
excepted from discharge."
SUMMARY
As a tort becomes involved in a bankruptcy proceeding, it
must be broken down into elements relevant to and controlled by the
Bankruptcy Act. If the tort is carefully analyzed, its bankruptcy
treatment can be charted. Some of the elements of tort to be
carefully observed and placed in their relationship to the bankruptcy
law are: (1) whether the tort claim belongs to the bankrupt or is a
claim against him at the time of the filing of the petition; (2) whether
it arises from an injury to the person or to property; (3) whether
it is transferable or is subject to process; (4) whether it is based on
an intentional or a negligent tort; (5) whether a suit was pending at
the time of the petition or had been reduced to judgment at that
time; (6) whether the claim is both contractual and tortious in nature;
and (7) whether it is a claim based on a tort given special treatment
by the Bankruptcy Act.
With these elements in mind, fate of the tort claim in bankruptcy
may be traced without great difficulty. Most such claims will be
denied participation in the bankruptcy procedure. Others will be
received only to be cast out; only a few will run the course of bank-
ruptcy proceeding and be subject to its asset gathering and distributing
processes.
as Note 28, supra.
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